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ABSTRACT 
Using micro-level panel data, the paper analyses the impacts of short-term capital flow 
volatility on new fixed investment spending of publicly traded real sector firms in three 
major emerging markets that are Argentina, Mexico and Turkey. The empirical results 
including comprehensive sensitivity tests suggest that increasing volatility of capital 
inflows has an economically and statistically significant negative effect on new 
investment spending of private firms. Accordingly, a 10 per cent increase in capital 
flow volatility reduces fixed investment spending in the range of 1-1.7, 2.3-15.1, and 1 
per cent in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey respectively. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
[Latin American experience] makes one sceptical that private markets alone will generate a 
flow of financial intermediation high enough to support a rate of long term fixed capital 
formation which fully exploits available high social rates of return to long term investments. 
Private uncertainties and scepticism of all sorts, which will not disappear by freeing interest 
rates, reduce the scope for private long-term finance (Diaz Alejandro, 1985: 381). 
The 1990s witnessed the return of international capital flows to the crises ridden countries of 
the developing world. The revival of international capital flows together with domestic economic 
reform programs along the “Washington Consensus” led to a strong shift of mood among 
economists, policy makers and investors regarding the long-term outlook of Emerging Markets. In 
this respect, recovery of capital inflows and accompanying neoliberal reform programs were 
expected to release foreign exchange and credit bottlenecks, generate capital market deepening, 
minimize moral hazard and rent seeking and finally support long-term investment and growth 
prospects of these economies.  
Nevertheless, after two decades of liberalisation experience some serious questions remain 
over the capacity of capital flows in achieving initial policy projections. In addition to unmet 
expectations, there is a growing debate over the direct role of such flows in generating the 
consecutive financial crises episodes in Mexico, South East Asia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and 
Turkey during the course of 1990s and early 2000s. On the other hand, despite the increasing volume 
and volatility of international capital flows during the 1990s very little has been written on their 
volatility. Apart from a few descriptive studies at the macroeconomic level, there is an apparent lack 
of in-depth analysis of the long-term effects of capital flow volatility on domestic investment 
performance in developing countries. 
What the present article argues is that financial liberalisation not only failed to realise its 
initial policy objectives such as capital market deepening and increased credit generation but also 
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created a volatile macroeconomic environment resulting from increasing exposure of domestic 
economies to the whims of international capital markets. As a result, increasing volatility of capital 
flows has become a major destabilizing force for fixed capital formation in developing countries.  
Given the lack of comparative in-depth analysis of developing country experiences, the 
current research has focused on three major developing countries that are Argentina, Mexico, 
and Turkey (AMT from here onwards), each of which at one point was presented as the poster 
child of financial liberalisation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). In retrospect, the experiences of these three countries have formed the theoretical as well 
as ideological basis of arguments (either for or against) on globalisation and liberalisation of 
markets in the developing world. 1  
The following figures also help emphasize the relative importance of these three countries 
among other emerging markets: Argentina and Mexico attracted 42 per cent of total FDI flows, 56 
per cent of total IMF credit and 43 per cent of total portfolio flows to Latin America between 1980-
2000.  Furthermore, between 1990-1994 and 1990-2000 Argentina, Mexico and Turkey received 53 
and 38 per cent of total portfolio flows to middle and lower income countries in the world. In fact, 
Turkey itself received 23 cents out of every dollar invested in middle income countries in the form of 
portfolio investment in 2000. Moreover, Turkey is not only the largest debtor of IMF accounting for 
46 per cent of the total outstanding credits and loans from the General Resources Account, but also 
has the highest quota/usage ratio from this account with 1011 per cent of its quota as of April, 2006. 
Employing micro level company panel data for each country separately, the empirical 
findings of this research suggest that increasing volatility of short-term capital flows have an 
economically and statistically significant negative effect on new fixed investment spending of private 
real sector firms. Accordingly, a 10 per cent increase in capital flow volatility reduces fixed 
investment spending in the range of 1-1.7, 2.3-15.1, and 1 per cent in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey 
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respectively. Given that industrial investment is increasingly accounting for a larger share of 
employment and output in emerging market economies, the negative effects of capital flow volatility 
is of significant importance. 
The next section presents a brief review of the recent liberalisation experience of Argentina, 
Mexico and Turkey followed by a discussion of determinants of international capital flows and the 
effects of their volatility on domestic macroeconomic environment and private investment. The 
fourth section presents the key hypothesis of interest. The fifth section introduces the empirical 
model followed by methodology, data and measurement issues. The sixth section presents the 
empirical results. The final section discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LIBERALISATION EXPERIENCE  
Argentina, Mexico and Turkey adopted the Ten Commandments of Washington Consensus 
starting from early 80s and together with Chile were the forerunners of neo-liberal economic 
restructuring among developing countries. However, despite being portrayed as a success story by 
the IMF and WB at the early stages of reforms, the ensuing economic performances were far from 
initial expectations (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003; Unctad, 2003). In retrospect, their experiences 
highlight some of the inherent contradictions and limitations of the neo-liberal economic model at 
least as it is applied in developing countries.  
Starting from late 1950s to mid and late 1970s, the economic landscapes of all three countries 
were characterized by an Import Substituting Industrialisation regime the main features of which 
included strict quantitative controls on international trade, repressed financial markets, overvalued 
exchange rates, and severe rationing in both foreign exchange and credit markets.  Among the trio, 
Turkey was the first that embarked on the stabilisation and structural adjustment program of IMF and 
WB starting from early 80s in the aftermath of a serious Balance of Payments (BOP) crisis (Demir, 
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2004).  The final stage of restructuring was in 1989 with the complete liberalisation of its capital 
account of BOP.  
On the other hand, Argentina and Mexico entered the 1980s with a more unfavourable 
environment resulting from the debt crisis of 1982 and the ensuing fall in external financing.  Both 
countries were cut from international financial community and faced large contraction in their 
economies accompanied by hyperinflation. The unorthodox Pacto agreement in 1987 for inflation 
stabilisation and debt restructuring under Brady Plan in 1989 helped release the external constraints 
for Mexico (Table 1). The accompanying liberalisation program under Washington Consensus and 
the related pro-foreign investment legislative changes (including capital account liberalisation in 
1989) combined with the signing of NAFTA in 1993 led to a strong change of mood towards 
Mexico. As a result of the change in investor expectations combined with favourable external 
conditions (such as low interest rates in the US) led to a surge of capital flows to Mexico. Between 
1990-93 net real short-term capital inflows by non-residents (RSCF) totalled $105 billion compared 
to –$63 billion between 1982-89. Overall, the net RSCF and real Foreign Direct Investment (RFDI) 
inflows have reached $146 and $203 billion between 1990 and 2005 (Table 1). Similarly, Argentina 
also embarked on this new wave by restructuring its debt in 1993 under Brady agreement. In 
addition, with the approval of IMF it started a semi-currency board system to control inflation and 
stabilise the economy under Convertibility regime by fixing exchange rate to dollar and abolishing 
all exchange and capital controls in 1991. The official date of capital account liberalisation was in 
1989 when restrictions on the movement of capital to and from Argentina were lifted.  
Comparatively, Argentina was also successful in attracting RSCF, which increased from a net of –$9 
billion between 1982-89 to $27 billion between 1990-93.  Moreover, the total RSCF and RFDI 
inflows have reached $50 and $97 billion between 1990-2005. Similarly, Turkey attracted large sums 
of short term inflows after capital account liberalization that reached $120 billion between 1990-2005 
although with a much limited inflows of FDI that totalled $26 billion for the same period (Table 1).  
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<Insert Table 1 Here> 
Among the expected benefits of reform programs were more efficient allocation of domestic 
savings, increasing credit generation for fixed investments, financial stability, and higher fixed 
capital formation and GDP growth rates. The performance of all three countries during the 90s is, 
however, far from achieving these objectives (Unctad, 2003:XI). Instead, in addition to major 
financial crisis episodes in 1994 (Mexico and Turkey), 1995 (Argentina), 2001 (Argentina and 
Turkey), the macro indicators regarding investment and growth performance is also lagging behind 
other emerging markets such as those in East Asia (Unctad, 2003).   
Although in Argentina and Mexico the semi-orthodox stabilisation and orthodox structural 
adjustment programs were successful in bringing the high inflation rates down from an average of 
159 and 80 per cent between 1982-89 to 4 and 7 per cent by 1994, they were not as successful on 
other accounts. In particular, the most visible fault lines ones are the comparatively low growth rates 
and steadily declining fixed capital formation in the economy that led Unctad (2003) to include AMT 
in the group of deindustrilisers among other developing countries. While the gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP fell from an average of 20 and 21 per cent to 17 and 19 per cent 
between 1980-89 and 2000-05 in Argentina and Mexico, it stagnated at the same level of 22 per cent 
in Turkey (Table 1).  These rates are well below the 25 per cent minimum that Unctad (2003:61) 
identified as the required threshold to generate high and sustained growth in middle-income 
developing countries. Furthermore, the real interest rates remained well above those in developed 
counties (Table 1).  
In this paper we focused on one key element of the recent AMT experience that is of 
significant importance in explaining their disappointing investment performances during the 90s: 
namely, the increasing uncertainty and volatility in macroeconomic environment caused by the rising 
volatility of short-tem capital flows. An in-depth analysis of these three major emerging markets, we 
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believe, will also help explain the reasons behind divergent outcomes in developed and developing 
countries following financial liberalisation.  
3. DETERMINANTS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND VOLATILITY 
In order to evaluate potential long-term effects of short-term capital flows, we need to 
understand the underlying forces behind their type, direction and volatility for the last two decades.  
At this point, despite the radical increase in the volume and volatility of global capital flows since 
1980s2, there is no consensus over their determinants. For a brief review, we divided the arguments 
on their determinants under two subgroups, which are the pull and the push factors. 
3.1 The Pull View 
The pull factors literature emphasizes the role of investors’ awareness, knowledge and past 
experiences regarding country specifics and fundamentals in determining the type, direction and 
volatility of capital flows.  According to this view, past mistakes, policy failures, and lack of 
institutional infrastructure (such as prudential regulation or well functioning capital markets, as 
argued by Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003) are the primary cause of high-risk overhang and high 
volatility of capital flows in developing countries. In other words, investors’ reluctance to make long-
term commitments to developing country markets results from experience and is a sign of continuing 
risk aversion and awareness by international investors (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1996).  
Accordingly, countries with high capital inflows are argued to have higher domestic saving rates, 
larger foreign exchange reserves and higher rates of growth as well as lower levels of volatility of 
inflation and real exchange rate, lower indebtedness, fiscal deficits and inflation together with lower 
levels of political risk than the ones experiencing low levels of inflows (Hernandez and Rudolf, 
1994; Fedderke and Liu, 2002). Therefore, capital flows are expected to become less volatile as 
investors become more informed and understand that there are significant differences across regions 
and countries. Edwards (1998), for example, based on the 1994 Mexican crisis argued that the 
contagion and volatility in Latin America have decreased. Similarly, Frankel and Schmukler (1996) 
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found that investors differentiated among countries to a greater extent after the 1994 crisis than after 
its 1982 predecessor.  In this respect, Beck (2001) also found that rule of law has a statistically 
significant negative effect on the volatility of net capital flows in the case of 56 emerging 
markets over the period of 1990-1998. As a result, international investors are agued to remain 
short-termist in their investments in developing countries and reduce their risk exposure to market 
fluctuations by remaining in more liquid forms of investments. Such differences in reactions can also 
explain the high volatility of capital flows to developing countries.  
On the other hand, the empirical evidence on the importance of pull factors is inconclusive. 
In a cross-country analysis for 1970-2000, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2004) failed to 
find any significant impact of institutional quality on the volatility of total capital flows. Similarly, 
several others failed to find any evidence that capital account openness hampers growth in economies 
with underdeveloped financial markets, weak institutions, severe macroeconomic imbalances or 
closed current accounts (Kraay, 1998; Arteta et al., 2001).  
Nevertheless, regardless of the controversy over the weight of domestic variables in investor 
decisions, the term structure and the type of capital flows can be interpreted as a sign of continued 
investor cautiousness towards emerging markets. That is why the increase in FDI inflows in AMT 
throughout the 1990s was seen as a much more positive development than the revival of 
portfolio flows for long-term growth and stability. Yet, according to Unctad FDI database, 76, 33 
and 21 per cent of all FDI inflows that arrived in AMT between 1990-2003 went on purchasing 
existing assets in the form of Mergers and Acquisitions rather than on Greenfield investment 
(Table 2).  Furthermore, net FDI inflows to AMT have remained at only around 15, 28 and 8 per 
cent of gross short-term capital inflows during the same period (Table 2).  
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
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3.2. The Push View: Asymmetric Information and External Shocks 
The push factors explain the determinants of international capital flows by 
exogenous/external factors.  Accordingly, changes in international capital markets and investor 
expectations are the main forces behind the direction of capital flows with significant effects on 
developing country markets independent of changes in their domestic economic fundamentals. 
It is argued that as business portfolios become more and more diversified in the highly 
integrated international capital markets, the marginal benefit of acquiring expensive country specific 
information decreases that discourages investors from obtaining detailed information on each country 
they invest in (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; Calvo, 1998). As a result, it becomes quite rational for 
investors to react even to small news. That is why, ‘small bad news’ even if there is no fundamental 
change in key economic indicators can increase the volatility of capital flows and trigger a financial 
crisis. In other words, since foreign investors are not be as responsive to real sector changes in 
the short-run as they are to news and market rumours, good fundamentals may not be sufficient 
to decrease country risk, reduce capital flow volatility, or to avert a financial crisis (Fitzgerald, 
2001). This makes the investors more vulnerable to herd behaviour and can cause major 
instabilities in domestic markets. In such an environment, it is of little surprise that liquid short-term 
investments appear to be the best way of hedging against uncertainty. 
The existing empirical evidence provide ample support to this view and suggest that 
following financial liberalisation external factors started accounting for most of the volatility and 
instability in real exchange rates, reserve movements, stock prices and the direction of capital flows 
in developing countries (Calvo et al., 1993; Grabel, 1995).  Furthermore, Chuhan et al. (1993) 
showed that external factors explained almost one-half of the bond and equity flows from the US to 
six Latin American countries. Similarly, Fernandez-Arias (1994) found that changes in international 
interest rates explain up to 60 per cent of deviation of portfolio inflows to 13 developing countries 
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from their 1989 levels. Furthermore, the pro-cyclical behaviour of external country risk ratings 
(upgrading countries in good times and downgrading them in bad times) may also help increase the 
volatility of capital flows and the boom-boost pattern in developing countries’ stock markets 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002).  
One common conclusion of pull and push factors literature is that foreign investors limit their 
portfolios in developing countries to liquid forms of investments that not only allow them to quit the 
market in a very short span of time but also increase the capital flow volatility.  The debate is more 
on the underlying reasons behind this result. The overwhelming evidence, however, supports the 
push factors (without denying the importance of pull factors) and suggests that short-termist 
decision-making on the part of investors create major problems regarding the stability of capital 
flows and therefore of domestic investment and growth in developing countries, which we discuss in 
the next section.  
4. SHORT TERM CAPITAL FLOWS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
4.1. Capital Market Development 
Given the presence of capital market imperfections in developing countries, financial 
liberalisation was expected to generate financial market deepening, reduce agency costs and 
asymmetric information, and to increase efficiency while directing limited resources to more efficient 
investment projects at lower costs.  These transformations, in return, were expected to provide macro 
and microeconomic stability and to boost private investment and growth in the medium and long run.   
Nevertheless, the empirical facts shed serious doubts over the success of liberalisation 
programs and accompanying capital flows in achieving the initial policy objectives. In the case of 
Argentina, Mexico and Turkey, the majority of papers fail to provide any evidence of efficiency 
gains for real sector firms. Regarding credit availability, despite comprehensive reform programs and 
increased market share of foreign banks3 strict credit rationing continues to persist with a lack of long 
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term credit availability for real sector firms (Fanelli et al., 1998; EIU, 2003a: 8-13, b: 37). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of any difference between domestic and foreign owned banks’ loan 
behaviour and the composition of loan portfolios (Goldberg et al., 2000). For example, similar to 
Turkey where the short-term to total debt ratio of top 500 manufacturing firms was around 70 per 
cent in 2005, in Argentina it was around 73 per cent for both tradable and nontradable goods sectors  
as of 1995 (ISO; Fanelli et al., 1998: 41). Table 1 further shows that total bank credit to the private 
sector as a share of GDP actually declined in Argentina from 26 per cent between 1980-89 to 19 per 
cent in 1990-99 and further to 16 per cent in 2000-2005. In the case of Mexico and Turkey, it was 15 
and 18 per cent between 1980-89, 25 and 20 per cent in 1990-99 and back to 16 and 20 per cent in 
2000-2005, which are all well below the high income OECD average of over 160 per cent or South 
Korea’s 100 per cent (WDI). Moreover, regarding capital market deepening, several Latin American 
countries (especially Mexico) have developed money markets mostly in short-term government 
papers, while capital markets in private securities remained underdeveloped (Rojas-Suarez and 
Weisbrod, 1996). Likewise, around 98 per cent of secondary market transactions in Turkey were of 
government securities as of 2004 (SPK, 2004). Lastly, high real interest rates and large spreads 
between borrowing and lending rates have continued to persist (Table 1; Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 
2000). In this picture, increasing capital flow volatility with sudden reversals cause significant 
distortions in the capital markets given the supply constrained nature of financial markets in 
developing countries with a disproportionate share of short term liabilities.  
4.2. Capital Flow Volatility and Investment Performance 
There is growing evidence, which shows that unregulated short-term capital flows have 
created serious problems for long-term investment and growth in developing countries. In most 
emerging markets, financial liberalisation has been accompanied by sharp fluctuations in key macro 
and micro prices together with increasing uncertainty. Kose et al. (2003), for example, found an 
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increase in consumption volatility in emerging markets during the 1990s. Furthermore, Gabriele et al. 
(2000: 1051) pointed out the ‘high, rising and unpredictable” volatility of capital flows to developing 
countries during the 1990s compared to late 70s and 80s. The empirical evidence also shows an 
increase in the volatility of stock markets as well as in the sales and earnings of firms in both 
developed and developing country markets for the last three decades (Grabel, 1995; Comin and 
Mulani, 2006; Wei and Zhang, 2006). In this respect, increasing volatility following financial 
liberalisation may also be self-exacerbating as the investors shorten their time horizons either to 
benefit from speculative gains or to avoid excess risk, which in turn further increases volatility. 
(Keynes, 1964, Ch. 12; Grebel, 1995)  
As a result, it is of little surprise that emerging economies appear as systematically becoming 
more vulnerable to both currency and banking crisis after financial liberalisation (Weller, 2001). At 
this point there is a general consensus that points out Short-term Capital Flows (SCFs) rather than 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as the main culprit behind increasing volatility and financial 
instability. Besides well known examples of potential positive effects of FDI, several papers also 
found that a higher share of long term capital flows vis-à-vis short-term ones help reduce the risk of a 
financial crisis (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Rodrik and Velasco, 2000).  
In addition to the above channels, volatility of capital flows also directly affect investment 
and growth performance by distorting price signals through changing relative goods prices. It is well 
documented that capital inflows lead to a bias against tradable goods vis-à-vis nontradables by 
causing a profitability squeeze in the real sectors that partly explains decreasing business savings and 
contraction of employment in these markets. (Berg and Taylor, 2000; Frenkel and Ros 2006). Unctad 
(1998, Chp.3) also argued that many of the weaknesses in economic fundamentals such as currency 
appreciation together with the resulting deterioration of the current account and increasing exchange 
rate risk is directly or indirectly related with the capital flows.    
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Regarding the effects of increasing macro and microeconomic uncertainty and volatility on 
investment and growth performance, there is no controversy in the current empirical research. In both 
developed and developing countries, uncertainty and volatility in key macro and micro prices 
(including different measures of uncertainty in real GDP growth, real exchange rate, relative prices 
of capital goods, and inflation) are found to have an economically and statistically investment and 
growth reducing effect (Edwards, 1989; Driver and Moreton, 1991; Aizenman and Marion, 1993, 
1996; Federer, 1993; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; Hausmann and Gavin, 1995; Ramey and Ramey, 
1995; Price, 1996; Darby et al., 1998; Serven, 1998). Similarly, Lensink and Morrissey (2006), found 
a significantly negative effect of FDI volatility on economic growth for a panel of 87 countries. 
Surprisingly, however, the direct effects of short-term capital flow volatility on private investment 
have been completely neglected. The only exception is Moguillansky (2002) who, using macro data 
for a panel of 16 Latin American countries, found that volatility of short-term capital flows has a 
statistically and economically significant negative effect on fixed capital formation.  
The volatility of SCFs in AMT has also increased following capital account liberalisation and 
appears to be driven not only by the investors’ preference to remain liquid but also by the availability 
of large arbitrage opportunities. Using the uncovered interest parity condition the net arbitrage gain is 
calculated as the difference between domestic interest rates deflated by the next period average 
depreciation of domestic currency, and the international interest rates (Table 1). Accordingly, while 
monthly arbitrage gain has increased from negative numbers during pre-liberalisation era to as high 
as 156, 259 and 482 per cent in AMT  in March 2003, March 1995, and May 1994 respectively, 
annual average gain has been two and sometimes three digit numbers (Table 1).  The real interest 
rates also remained very high in international standards at 6.2, 4.2 and 9.4 per cent on average 
between 1991-2005 with annual average peaks being at 23, 9.4 and 23.8 per cent in 2001, 1999, and 
2002 in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey respectively. The simple correlation coefficient (in absolute 
values) between RSCF and net financial arbitrage has been .58, .36 and .65 between 1990-2000 and 
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.60, .91 and .44 during 2000-2005 in AMT respectively. The latest of such cycles is most visible in 
the case of Turkey in the aftermath of 2001 crisis (Table 1). Similarly, the correlation between CAB 
and financial arbitrage has been .86, .74 and .63 between 1990-2000 and .29, .46 and .21 between 
1990-2005 respectively.  
During this period, Table 1 also shows an increase in the volatility of GDP growth with an 
increasing dependence on private short-term capital inflows as the engine of growth. The simple 
correlation coefficient between current account balance (CAB) and real GDP growth (RGDPG) rate 
(in absolute values) has been .73, .70, and .75 between 1990-93 while that of RSCF and RGDPG 
were .43, .97 and .62 for the same period. The overall correlation for 1990-2005 between CAB and 
RGDP has been .23, .26 and .70 while that of RSCF and RGDP has been .32, .40 and .62 
respectively. In all three cases the neoliberal era coincided with increasing boom-bust cycles yet 
overall with lower investment rates.    
In order to capture the magnitude of the shock caused by external capital inflows in AMT, we 
compared gross capital inflows (that is the sum of the absolute value of monthly net capital inflows 
by nonresidents) with the net inflows using the US treasury data (where monthly transactions 
between the US and corresponding countries are recorded). The motivation for this is that the main 
challenge to developing countries comes not only from the size of net flows but more importantly 
from the gross flows vis-à-vis domestic stock variables. Therefore, focusing only on net flows will 
give a distorted or at best incomplete picture of the real shock faced by the recipient countries.  
According to Table 2, between 1984 and 2003 the net inflows to gross inflows ratio has been 0.36 
per cent in Argentina, 2.7 per cent in Mexico and 4 per cent in Turkey. When looking at their 
periodical breakdown, not surprisingly the majority of inflows took place following the capital 
account liberalisation of 1989. Between 1990 and 2003, gross inflows increased 50 times in 
Argentina, 21 times in Mexico and 42 times in Turkey compared to the 1984-1989 period. The 
figures using total net inflows data from IMF in Table 1 also show this radical surge in inflows after 
 15 
1989. On the other hand the increase in net inflows remained much smaller. While gross inflows 
stand around 592, 553 and 188 billion US dollars in AMT, the net inflows remained at US$5, $27 
and $7 billion respectively between 1990 and 2003 (Table 2). Figure 1 highlights the discrepancy 
between the gross and net inflows by looking at the ratio between net and gross capital inflows in 
AMT using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter (HP), which is used to obtain a smooth estimate of the long-
term trend component of the series.4 Accordingly, there is a sudden jump in the volatility of capital 
inflows to AMT following the capital account liberalisation of 1989 as seen from the increase in 
gross inflows vis-à-vis net inflows.   
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
5. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
To sum up, increasing volatility of capital flows affects domestic investment through micro 
and macroeconomic transmission channels in the form of fluctuations in:  a) domestic interest rates 
and credit availability, b) real exchange rates, and nominal exchange rate expectations, c) domestic 
absorption, d) systemic risk from uncertainty regarding future profitability and macro environment, 
and, e) liquidity premium and opportunity cost of fixed investment.  
Regarding model specification for empirical estimation, there is a vast literature on the 
determinants of investment and in particular on the specification of investment functions (see for 
example, Blundell et al., 1992; Roma, 1993; Mairesse et al., 1999). The empirical studies that are 
based on investment models can be grouped under q-model of investment, Euler estimations, the 
accelerator model of error correction methods, and the synthesis approach. While the structural 
models are derived from standard optimization problems, the synthesis approaches including the 
error correction methods and distributed lag models rely less on structural equations but more on 
stylized facts regarding model specification with the help of the flexibility of distributed lags.5 Both 
groups of models include a set of standard control variables including past investment rates, capital-
output ratio, relative cost of capital, economic growth, real wages, cash flow and volatility in 
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macroeconomic variables (in the case of measurement of uncertainty). In this respect, similar to 
Serven (1998) and Chirinko et al. (1999), given its better empirical tract record we adopt the 
synthesis approach  loosely following Serven (1998), Mairesse et al. (1999) and Agrawal (2004) in 
our model specification.   The relationship is tested with the following dynamic investment equation 
for each country separately: 
ittttititititiit NSCFVKOKOIII εααααα ++++++= −−−−−− 1,1,52,41,32,21,1                   (1)         
where i=1, …, N and t=1, …, T respectively refer to the cross section and time series elements of the 
data.  ε is the error term. Iit is the real net fixed investment of firm i in period t and is measured by the 
logarithmic difference of net fixed capital stock at constant prices ( itk∆ ).6 We kept the lags at 2 for Iit 
and KOit given that it may take more than one-period (half year) to adjust for adjustment costs and 
delivery lags. A detailed discussion of the variable definitions is provided in the appendix. 
KOit is Capital/Output ratio and is based on the proportionality of output and capital in the 
long run with short-run fluctuations. The lags in the response of investment spending to KO result 
from the following: a) the role of expectations given that new investment depends on expected future 
sales which themselves rely on current and past sales, b) adjustments costs and delivery lags (Abel 
and Blanchard, 1986). Hence, a decreasing KO ratio is expected to increase new investment. Here net 
sales are used as a proxy for the value of output. 
SCFVi,t-1 is the volatility of real Short-term Capital Inflows the measurement of which is 
discussed in the data and measurement section. Increasing volatility is expected to have a negative 
effect on new fixed investment through the channels discussed in the previous sections.  We used 
one-period lagged values given that the data are bi-annual and we expect the volatility to show its 
effects on investment spending not in the current period for which it was already planned and 
undertaken but for the following periods’ investments.  
 Nt is a vector of control variables including:  
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Real GDP growth rate (GDP) suggesting that increasing economic growth stimulates new 
fixed investment through changes in aggregate demand and investor expectations.7  Given the 
negative effect of volatility on economic growth, the SCFV coefficient might lose its significance 
once controlled for GDP growth if that were the main channel through which it affects investment.  
Operating profits to capital ratio (OK) to control for the effects of internal funds on 
investment decisions under credit constraints. It is well established in the literature that in markets 
with credit constraints internal cash flow is a significant determinant of investment spending. Also, 
capital flow volatility affects fixed investment through its effect on firm’s cash flow. We expect cash 
flow to have a positive coefficient reflecting the presence of capital market imperfections (consistent 
with Gelos and Werner, 2002; and Leaven, 2003). If the capital flow volatility affects investment 
performance only through its impact on firm profits, then we expect the volatility coefficient to lose 
its significance once controlled for cash flow.  
Total credit from the banking to the private sector as a share of GDP (Cr). We expect that 
increasing credit availability enables new investment projects and thus is expected to have a positive 
coefficient. Given the procyclical nature of credit generation, increasing volatility affects investment 
also through its effect on total supply of credits. If this is the key channel, then volatility coefficient 
may lose its significance after controlling for the credit generation in the market.  
Real interest rate (Rint) to control for the effect of domestic interest rates on investment 
spending. Increasing real interest rates negatively affect new investments through: a) raising the 
discount rate (and the opportunity cost) that is used to calculate the net present value of new 
investment projects, and b) raising the cost of external borrowing. Capital flow volatility may also 
lead to higher interest rates through higher risk premium and higher expected nominal exchange rates 
and therefore reduce fixed investments.  
We also explore the differences between small and large firms’ reaction to capital flow 
volatility using Dsmall, which is a size dummy that takes that takes the value of one if net sales of firm 
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i at time t are smaller than the sample median. SCFV may have asymmetric effects on small and large 
firms especially given the better access of large firms to capital markets with more diversified 
portfolios. 
And finally, a set of time dummies.  
5.1 Methodology 
The datasets consist of non-random stock market quoted firms, which may receive market 
listing only if they satisfy certain conditions. Therefore, in order to correct for parameter endogeneity 
resulting from the presence of unobserved firm-fixed effects as well as to correct for the correlation 
between the lagged Iit and firm specific effects and the error term, we used a Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991)’s first differencing transformation that is 
widely used to have a consistent estimate for dynamic panel equations.8 Accordingly, we applied the 
following first-difference transformation using Arelano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation. The first 
differencing is assumed to remove the individual firm-specific effects while the GMM estimation 
corrects for any remaining endogeneity as well as the correlation between ∆vit and ∆yit. 
itititit vxyy ∆+∆+∆=∆ − '1 βα             (2) 
In this transformation, if xit is serially uncorrelated then xi,t-s will be uncorrelated with xit* for  
s ≥ 2. This means that if the error term in the investment equation is serially uncorrelated, lagged 
values of the transformed (or untransformed) dependent variable9 and other right-hand side variables 
dating t-s will be uncorrelated with the transformed error term as long as s ≥ 2.  As discussed by 
Bond and Meghir (1994: 210), remote lags are not likely to provide much additional information and 
therefore we did not include all moment restrictions in our calculations (we used 32 ≤≤ t lagged 
values of right hand side variables and time dummies at levels as instruments10). The validity of the 
instruments and the estimation are tested by two specification-tests as suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The first one is the Sargan-test of over-identifying restrictions for testing the validity of 
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instruments used. The second one is the usual m2 test that is a second-order serial-correlation test of 
the residuals from the first-difference equation. The reason for this is that the use of endogenous t-2 
dated variables is valid only if there is no serial correlation in the error term of order 2.  
5.2 Data and Measurement 
The datasets are from the audited financial accounts of publicly traded industrial firms in 
AMT and are unbalanced. The period analysed is biannual and cover 1991:2-2001:2 for Argentina, 
1990:2-2003:2 for Mexico and 1993:1-2003:2 for Turkey. The primary reason for using biannual 
data is to capture the real impact of the volatility of capital flows on fixed investment decisions of 
private sector firms. Given the high velocity with which financial capital travels in and out of any 
country, annual flow measures do not capture the real volatility of these flows (see Table 1 and 2, 
and Figure 1). As a result, when trying to capture the volatility of capital flows using annual data or a 
moving average series, there might be a significant bias in the calculations.  
The firm level data for Argentina and Mexico is mostly from Economatica, a commercial 
database providing detailed financial statement data for publicly traded Latin American companies.11  
For Turkey the dataset is from the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market online database. In some cases 
Worldscope International database, Datastream, and original firm financial statements are also used 
for robustness and/or completeness. For Mexico and Turkey, we have dropped those firms with less 
than eight consecutive data points from the dataset. For Argentina, we kept the minimum threshold 
level at five because of its smaller number of cross section firms.12 The firms included are all 
industrial firms with majority of them in manufacturing. For Argentina there are 61 firms in the final 
dataset with 50 in manufacturing (ISIC 15-37), three in construction (ISIC 45), four in mining (ISIC 
10-14) and four in electricity power generation and distribution (ISIC 40). In the case of Mexico, 
there are 79 firms in the final dataset with 63 in manufacturing (ISIC 15-37), four in mining (ISIC 
10,12,13,14) and 12 in construction (ISIC 45). For Turkey, there are 172 firms all in manufacturing 
(ISIC 15-37).  
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Regarding Short-term Capital Flows, the available data from national sources of AMT are not 
uniform and cover different time periods for different frequencies. As a result, in constructing the 
volatility variable for Argentina and Mexico, we have used the US Treasury International Capital 
Reporting System that provides monthly cross border investment transactions of short term and long 
term securities vis-à-vis the US and foreign countries.13 Given the close proximity of Argentine and 
Mexican markets to the US the data series are assumed to be close estimates of the total capital 
inflows to these countries. Also, given the locomotive effect of capital flows from the US, the 
volatility of these flows is not expected to deviate significantly from the total flows. In the case of 
Turkey, monthly balance of payments data, which is available from the Central Bank of Republic of 
Turkey starting from 1992, is employed instead (Table 2 and Figure 2). Given that Turkey is not in 
such close proximity to the US market as Argentina and Mexico, possible biases caused by the way 
US treasury data are recorded will be avoided this way.14 As the measure of capital inflows, we have 
used real net monthly inflows (deflated by US Producer Price Index with base year 2000). However, 
for sensitivity analysis gross inflows (in absolute values) are also calculated to capture the total size 
of capital moving in and out of the economy by nonresidents (Table 2 and Figure 1). 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
The net inflows variable is equal to net sale of long-term [Argentine, Mexican, Turkish] stock 
and bonds15 plus changes in the sum of total US banks’ claims on foreign public borrowers and 
unaffiliated foreigners and on own offices. For Turkey, the net short-term capital inflows variable is 
calculated as the sum of equity securities liabilities, debt securities liabilities, other investment 
liabilities-loans of banks and other sectors, other investment currency deposits of banks and other 
investment other liabilities from monthly balance of payments statistics. As for the volatility 
measure, the biannual standard deviations of real net monthly inflows are used (Figure 2).16 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
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 The results from Table 2 uncover a significantly negative relationship between the volatility 
variable and private fixed investment in all three countries. The results are robust to sensitivity tests 
with alternative model specifications. In particular, in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 3 we 
analyzed the effects of capital flow volatility (SCFV) on fixed investment performance after 
controlling for other important determinants of private investment including real GDP growth 
(GDP), operating profits (OK), total domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (Cr), and 
real interest rates (Int). Regardless of specification, the capital flow volatility variable have an 
economically and statistically (at 1% level) significant negative effect on new fixed investment 
spending of real sector firms in all three countries. Accordingly, a 10 per cent increase in capital flow 
volatility reduces fixed investment spending in the range of 1-1.7, 2.3-15.1, and 1 per cent in 
Argentina, Mexico and Turkey respectively.  Using our point elasticities, we can then estimate, for 
instance, the impact of the most serious economic crisis in Turkish history during 2000:2 and 2001:1 
on private investment. In 2000:2 and 2001:1, the SCFV increased by 87 and 69 per cent compared to 
the same period of previous year that implies an 8.7 and 6.9 per cent decline in private fixed 
investment rates that are quite close to the stylized facts given that the economy contracted by 7.6 per 
cent in 2001 with a sharp fall in fixed capital formation rate (Table 1).  
 In columns (1) to (4) of Table 3, the results show that the volatility of capital flows 
significantly reduce fixed investments even after controlling for the significantly positive effects of 
real GDP growth17, operating profits and credit availability. As discussed before, one of the key 
channels SCFV affects developing country markets and investment performance is through its 
impacts on economic growth, firm profitability and credit generation due to pro-cyclical nature of 
these key variables. Furthermore, domestic interest rates are also highly procyclical with capital 
flows. As shown on column (4), after controlling for the negative effect of increasing real interest 
rates, SCFV still appears to have an economically and statistically significant negative effect on new 
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investments. In the case of capital-output ratio variable, as expected we have found a significantly 
negative relationship in all three countries. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
 Furthermore, in order to explore any differences between small and large firms in their 
investment response to capital flow volatility, we have divided the sample into two groups using firm 
size based on the median sales for each country. We then constructed a small-firm dummy (DSmall) 
that took the value of one if real net sales at time t were smaller than the sample median. Table 4 
shows the regression results using the specification in column (4) of Table 3 with the addition of this 
dummy variable. Accordingly, we have found that capital flow volatility has a significantly larger 
investment reducing effect in small firms in Mexico and Turkey. There may be several reasons for 
this: a) large firms having better diversification of their investment portfolios may be able to shield 
sudden capital flow reversals better, b) large firms with better access to capital markets may be able 
to find external credits easier and at better rates during sudden reversals of capital flows (that lead to 
lower internal cash flow and lower external supply of loanable funds with higher interest rates) than 
small firms.  In the case of Argentina, however, SCFV appeared to have a larger investment 
depressing effect in large firms. This result may be due to the special situation of Argentina during 
the 1990s when the country adopted a virtual currency board system and fixed its exchange rate to 
dollar that led to high levels of dollarisation of the economy and encouraged firms to have significant 
open positions. As a result, increasing capital flow volatility might have affected large firms more 
than small firms. However, the exact factors behind this finding are beyond the scope of current 
research.  
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
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Finally, in both Table 3 and 4 the Sargan specification test confirms the validity of 
instruments used and the AR(2) test indicate no sign of second-order serial correlation in the model 
estimations. 
7. CONCLUSION 
One of the main arguments in favour of liberalisation of capital markets was to direct 
domestic (and international) savings to long-term investment, and hence to enable developing 
countries to achieve a stable long-run growth path. However, if one to judge the degree of success of 
the reform programs of the 80s and 90s with the level of divergence between the policy targets and 
realised outcomes, the results have been quite disappointing in all three countries.  
At the global scale, the post-Breton Woods era has been characterised with increasing macro 
and micro volatility and uncertainty, higher frequency and magnitude of financial crisis and boom 
bust cycles, lower investment and growth rates, and perverse flow of funds from developing to 
developed countries.  The US alone imported 65 per cent of all world savings to finance its over $850 
billion Current Account deficit in 2006. On the other hand, developing countries are trying to self-
insure themselves against the increased volatility in financial markets by accumulating large sums of 
unproductive, idle and in fact quite costly foreign exchange reserves that offer very low rates of 
return. According to the IMF data, total reserve accumulation in the world has increased from $1.9 
trillion in 1997 to $5.1 trillion in 2006, 72 per cent of which has been held by developing countries. 
During this period, for example, the foreign exchange reserves of China has increased 9 folds from 
140 billion in 1997 to $1.2 trillion in 2006 while that of Korea has increased 12 folds from 20 billion 
to $242 billion. 
Using the recent liberalization experiences of three major emerging markets, the findings of 
this research show one key reason why developing countries are increasingly accumulating large 
sums of reserves: that is to avoid the significantly negative effect of short-term capital flow volatility 
on domestic investment rates.18 Overall, the results suggest that under a liberalised financial system it 
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is not possible to analyse the determinants of private investment independent of changes in the 
volatility of international capital flows. Accordingly, financial liberalisation when accompanied by 
increasing volatility of short-term capital flows becomes instrumental in reducing real sector 
investment spending and as a result may alter the pattern of capital accumulation in the real sectors of 
the economy. In retrospect, the policy makers in all three countries appear to have failed to consider 
any strategy to link financial liberalisation programs and accompanying short-term distortions with 
the medium and long-term domestic development objectives. In this respect, there has been an 
incomplete concern regarding determinants of productive investment after financial liberalisation.   
Given that the annual FX trading to world trade ratio has increased from 2/1 in 1973 to 90/1 
in 2004, the increasing volatility in capital markets is in fact of little surprise (BIS, 2005). What is 
surprising, however, is the lack of long-term credit for investment in developing countries despite 
$1.8 trillion daily foreign exchange turnover in world capital markets. Furthermore, it is equally 
surprising that despite major instabilities caused by SCFs for private investment, there is no 
international mechanism to curb the excess volatility in global financial markets. Thus, we suggest 
that there is an urgent need to reform both domestic and international financial system so that 
domestic and foreign savings are directed towards productive investment rather than speculative and 
highly volatile financial ones. To achieve this, the main policy recommendation of this paper is to 
realise macro and microeconomic stability through reducing capital flow volatility and through the 
use of counter-cyclical macro policies. 
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APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Cr: Total credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (for Argentina it is measured as the 
growth rate of total real credit to the private sector). 
KO: Capital-output ratio measured as beginning fixed capital stock (Kt-1) /net sales at 
constant prices. 
RGDPG: Real GDP growth measured as log difference of real GDP deflated by GDP 
deflator. 
OK: Operating Profits (net-operating revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus operating 
expenses) /Ki,t-1 
RSCF: Real Short-term Capital Inflows defined as annual portfolio investment liabilities 
(equity plus debt securities) plus other investment banks liabilities plus other investment other sector 
Liabilities from International Financial Statistics of IMF. 
Rint: Biannual average real interest rate calculated as ln[(1+T-Bill Rate)/(1+Producer Price 
Inflation)] 
SCFV: Short-term capital inflow volatility calculated as the biannual standard deviations of 
real net monthly capital inflows. The net inflows variable (Table 2 and Figure 1) is equal to net sale 
of long-term [Argentine, Mexican, Turkish] stock and bonds plus changes in the sum of total US 
banks’ claims on foreign public borrowers and unaffiliated foreigners and on own offices. For 
Turkey, the net inflows variable is calculated as the sum of equity securities liabilities, debt securities 
liabilities, other investment liabilities-loans of banks and other sectors, other investment currency 
deposits of banks and other investment other liabilities from monthly balance of payments statistics.  
Argentina 
In converting to real prices, Producer Price Index (at 1995 prices) period averages are used 
for net sales and operational profits while end-of-period values are used for net fixed assets. The 
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macro data are from IFS, and Central Bank of Argentina. Overall, the manufacturing firms in the 
dataset represent 23 per cent of total manufacturing sales in Argentina. 
Kt: Net fixed assets and includes net property, plant and equipment. The land is not disclosed 
in the balance sheets separately and therefore is included in the calculations. Also, resulting from 
new accounting standards in 2002, the comparison of fixed assets and investments before and after 
2002 became impossible, which is why our dataset stops in 2001:2. 
Mexico 
In converting to real prices, Producer Price Index (at 2003 December prices) period averages 
are used for net sales and operational profits, while end-of-period values are used for net fixed assets. 
The manufacturing firms in the dataset represent 36 per cent of total manufacturing sales in 2003.  
The macro data are from IFS and Banco de Mexico. 
Kt: Includes net property, plant and equipment together with the land given that it is not 
disclosed separately. The data are at replacement cost till 1997 and at current prices since then. 
During the estimation, several methods, which are available from the author upon request, are 
applied to test for the consistency of this variable because of the change in its measurement.  
Turkey 
All data are converted to fixed prices using Manufacturing Price Index at 1995 January prices 
from the Central Bank of Turkey.  The macro data are from Central Bank of Turkey and IFS.  The 
firms in the dataset accounted for 22 per cent of total sales in manufacturing sectors in Turkey in 
2003.   
Kt: Includes all existing capital stock net of depreciation excluding land (which is not subject 
to depreciation and is recorded at historical cost without revaluation). This includes all the fixed 
assets that are subject to revaluation at the end of each period. Under Turkish GAAP, fixed assets are 
recorded at historical cost and revalued each period according to the pre-announced official rate. 
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
1
 The commonalities in the liberalisation experience of AMT have recently been highlighted by 
several other comparative analyses (see for example Onis, 2004).  
2
 Total FDI inflows to developing countries increased from $8.4 billion in current prices in 1980 to 
37 billion in 1990 and 209 billion in 2001 while total world FDI inflows increased from  $55 billion 
to 209 billion and 824 billion during the same period. Net Private capital flows to developing 
countries, on the other hand, increased from around 41 billion in 1980 to 38 billion and $146 billion 
in 1990 and 2001  (UNCTAD, 2004). Average daily turnover in traditional FX markets increased 
from 590 billion in 1989 to $1880 billion in 2004 while global daily world trade increased from 21 
billion in 1989 to $52 billion dollars in 2003 (BIS, 2005) 
3
 In Argentina and Mexico foreign banks accounted for 53 per cent and 82 per cent of total bank 
assets as of 2002 up from 18 and 1 per cent in 1994 
4
 By default, we set the penalty parameter that controls the smoothness of the series equal 400. 
5
 Chirinko et al. (1999) provides a detailed discussion of the advantages of distributive lag models 
over structural ones. 
6
 That is, δ−≅∆≅∆+==∆
−−−− 1,1,1,1, //]/1log[]/log[ tiittiittiittiitit KIKKKKKKk  where δ is the 
depreciation rate and Kit is end of period net fixed assets. 
7
 Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) and Oliva and Rivera-Batiz (2002) found that growth drives 
investment rather than the other way around.   
8
 Blundell et al., (1992) provide a comparative analysis of different panel data techniques in 
econometric models of firm investment based on micro data. 
9
 On this issue, see for example Greene (1997:641). 
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10
 In the GMM estimation, the White period based on Arellano and Bond (1991) 2-step method is 
used for GMM weighting matrices. The reported coefficient covariances are robust and corrected 
using White (1980) period weights from final iteration.  
11
 There are certain problems with the Economatica database that researchers need to be aware of. An 
appendix including a detailed list of corrections is available from the author upon request. 
12
 There is only one firm with five and four firms with six data points. The rest of the firms have at 
least 10 consecutive time series. 
13
 For an analysis of the data on the US system for measuring cross-border securities investment see 
for example, Griever et al. (2001). Also for information on data coverage and measurement issues 
see the treasury web site at http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/index.html. 
14
 For a discussion of such limitations see for example. Griever et al., 2001:640. 
15
 From Foreign Purchases and Sales of Long-Term Domestic and Foreign Securities by Type tables 
of the treasury, Data column titles correspond to column titles in Treasury Bulletin Table CM-V-4, 
excluding CM-V-4 columns (1) and (8). 
16
 Two other alternatives to measure the volatility of capital inflows are the coefficient of variation 
and normalisation using GDP weights. While both methods are used in cross-country analysis, they 
don’t affect the results in single country regressions. Also, an important drawback of the second 
method is that it is biased upwards during and after any economic turmoil where GDP contracts.   
17
 The only anomaly in our results is from Mexico where in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 real GDP 
growth appeared with a negative coefficient.  
18
 To give an example, after 10 years since the 1997 crisis neither the manufacturing employment nor 
the percentage share of GDP devoted to fixed capital formation is back to its pre-crisis levels in S. 
Korea.  
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Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators 
 
 
Notes: RSCF is Real short-term capital inflows by non-residents in 2000 prices-millions of USD (for details see the Appendix). RFDI is Real FDI inflows in 
2000 prices - millions of USD. STDRSCF is annual standard deviation of quarterly RSCF. CAB is Current Account Balance as a percentage of GDP. Arbitr is 
annual average of monthly net financial arbitrage measured as *)1()]1/()1[(
^
RER +−++ where R is 3-month domestic t-bill rate or its equivalent, 
^
E  is 
average depreciation of domestic currency-end of period values- against US dollar, R* is 3-month US T-bill rate. Int is annual average of monthly real interest 
rate deflated by next period’s realized consumer inflation. Cr is domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. Inf is consumer price inflation. 
GFCFG/GDP is the Gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio in percentages. RGDPG is Real GDP growth in constant 2000 domestic prices.  
Source: International Financial Statistics of IMF, WDI and author’s calculations.
    Average Average Average     Average           Net Net Net 
  1979-81 1982-89 1990-93 1994 1995 
1996-
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1982-
89 
1990-
94 
1995-
2000 
RSCF  A 3,538 -2,393 6,654 15,640 12,491 8,338 -6,252 -13,309 -11,336 -10,621 -4,681 -19,142 42,255 54,180 
 M 19,812 -7,988 26,219 12,639 -12,850 7,865 2,919 -4,538 -1,333 495 4,847 -63,902 117,515 26,477 
  T -1,058 959 6,797 -6,733 5,295 8,171 -14,701 2,370 9,513 22,883 32,895 959 20,456 46,150 
STDRSCF A 1,431 830 4,969 1,748 1,953 2,980 2,066 1,448 1,556 1,558 1,504    
  M 2,083 1,504 1,761 7,052 6,201 3,679 2,999 2,557 2,364 3,206 2,579    
 T  314 933 767 1,025 2,729 741 1,468 1,978 794 1,852    
RFDI A 828 681 3,253 4,005 5,968 12,064 2,142 2,175 1,587 3,868 3,988 5,445 17,016 66,287 
 M 3,168 2,493 4,547 12,091 10,135 13,679 26,845 19,278 14,660 17,141 15,829 19,940 30,278 78,528 
  T 94 243 842 670 942 880 3,315 1,151 1,684 2,567 8,163 1,943 4,040 5,342 
CAB A -1.84 -2.95 -0.64 -4.26 -1.98 -3.77 -1.41 9.25 6.22 2.27 3.23    
 M -5.34 0.18 -5.02 -7.05 -0.55 -2.52 -2.85 -2.18 -1.39 -0.98 -0.61    
 T -3.04 -1.08 -1.44 2.03 -1.38 -1.48 2.33 -0.83 -3.34 -5.16 0.00    
Arbitr A 48.12 62.55 206.68 4.58 6.38 2.68 11.41 16.55 31.23 1.04 -1.85       
 M 6.73 -3.55 11.64 -16.04 42.37 15.25 17.31 -7.31 6.49 3.55 13.67    
  T -29.86 -0.48 0.27 47.21 23.83 12.18 45.28 43.73 84.74 15.67 16.38       
Int A 11.66 41.82 64.25 3.47 11.56 8.23 23.59 11.20 7.35 -4.09 -6.86    
 M -2.61 -2.60 4.77 4.00 -0.41 5.87 6.38 1.87 2.03 2.27 5.14    
 T -22.99 4.65 0.83 11.23 8.72 12.65 -1.11 23.76 22.15 12.12 7.20     
Cr A 30.52 25.33 15.48 20.28 19.96 23.01 20.83 15.33 10.76 10.50 11.67       
 M 19.63 13.48 24.53 38.74 29.27 20.60 14.12 15.69 15.31 14.63 15.82    
  T 14.85 18.60 17.48 15.94 18.49 23.69 20.67 14.79 16.26 20.49 26.15       
Inf A 78.86 159.19 112.67 4.09 3.32 -0.10 -1.07 23.01 12.61 4.32 9.21    
 M 24.01 79.49 18.64 6.97 35.00 19.40 6.36 5.03 4.55 4.69 3.99    
 T 79.17 45.85 65.64 106.19 88.14 74.10 54.40 44.96 25.30 8.60 8.18    
GFCF/GDP A 23.55 18.92 16.09 19.94 17.94 18.32 14.18 11.96 15.14 19.15 21.46       
 M 25.64 18.94 18.67 19.35 16.15 20.17 20.00 19.25 18.93 19.63 19.30    
  T 21.06 21.88 24.21 24.62 23.84 24.06 18.17 16.59 15.46 17.82 19.56       
RGDPG A 12.75 -0.42 5.74 5.67 -2.89 2.54 -4.51 -11.54 8.47 8.64 8.78       
 M 8.30 0.65 3.64 4.32 -6.36 5.31 -0.03 0.77 1.43 3.92 2.91    
  T 0.23 4.67 5.84 -5.58 6.94 3.83 -7.61 7.51 5.78 8.55 7.12       
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Table 2: Gross and Net Capital Inflows to Argentina, Mexico and Turkey, 1984-2003 
 
Note: Gross stands for gross short-term capital inflows, which are the sum of the absolute value of 
monthly net capital inflows from the US. Net stands for net short-term capital inflows, which are the 
sum of the monthly net capital inflows from the US. FDI is net FDI inflows, M&A is net Merger and 
Acquisition type FDI, M&A/FDI is M&A divided by FDI, FDI/Gross is FDI divided by Gross short 
term capital inflows. 
Source: The US Treasury International Capital Reporting System, Central Bank of Republic of 
Turkey, Unctad FDI database.  
*The data are for the 1992-2003 period based on Central Bank of Republic of Turkey database. 
**The ratio is biased upwards given that FDI inflows are multilateral while Gross inflows are 
bilateral between US and AMT. 
Millions of US Dollars in Current Prices 
 Argentina Mexico Turkey Turkey* 
Short-Term Inflows Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net 
1984-1989 11,685 -2,803 26,497 -11,921 4,511 295   
1984-2003 603,528 2,192 579,636 15,380 192,990 7,678   
1990-2003 591,843 4,995 553,139 27,301 188,479 7,383 198,895 48,449 
1990-2003         
    -FDI  85,540  152,264  14,781   
    -M&A  65,154  50,282  3,074   
    -M&A/FDI  76%  33%  21%   
    -FDI/Gross**  15%  28%  8%  7% 
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Table 3: Private Investment and Capital Flow Volatility, dependent variable Iit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  t-1, t-2 refers to the first-and second lags. KO is capital-output ratio, SCFV is capital flow volatility, GDP is real GDP growth rate. 
OK is operating profits to capital stock ratio, Cr is credit to private sector as a share of GDP (except for Argentina where it is measured as 
the real credit to private sector growth). Rint is the real interest rate in natural logs. All regressions initially included a set of (unreported) 
time dummies. Sargan is Sargan-test for overidentifying restrictions. m1 and m2 are first and second-order serial correlation tests. All test 
statistics are given by their p-values. Standard Errors (in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity consistent. (***), (**), (*) refer to significance 
at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. 
 
 Argentina    Mexico    Turkey    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
             
It-1 -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.3*** -0.20*** -0.24*** -0.2*** -0.24*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
It-2 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.01 -0.05** -0.01 -0.05** -0.03** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
KOt-1 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
KOt-2 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.004*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
  (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
SCFV
 t-1 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0004* -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.0003) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
GDP
 t-1 0.19   0.10 -1.73   -17.82*** 0.63***   0.46*** 
 (0.21)   (0.12) (3.18)   (4.31) (0.01)   (0.01) 
OK
 t-1  0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.02***  0.03*** 
 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CR
 t-1   0.02    0.43    0.32***  
 
  (0.02)    (0.78)    (0.02)  
Rint
 t-1    -0.1    -0.60***    -0.002*** 
 
   (0.09)    (0.31)    (0.00003) 
 
            
Sargan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
m1 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
m2 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.48 0.42 0.48 0.19 0.25 0.12 0.19 
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Table 4: Private Investment and Capital Flow Volatility, Small vs. Large Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Dsmall is a size dummy that takes that takes the value of one if net sales at time t are smaller 
than the sample median. SCFV* Dsmall is an interaction term. For other variable definitions refer to 
Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Argentina Mexico Turkey 
    
It-1 -0.25*** -0.19*** -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.004) 
It-2 -0.11*** -0.04 -0.01*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.003) 
KOt-1 -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.07*** 
 (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) 
KOt-2 -0.003 -0.03*** -0.05*** 
  (0.003) (0.01) (0.002) 
SCFV
 t-1 -0.0003*** -0.003*** -0.0001*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000002) 
(SCFV*DSmall)
 t-1 0.0001*** -0.00002* -0.00004*** 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.000001) 
GDP
 t-1 0.18 -29.41*** 0.45*** 
 (0.12) (1.69) (0.01) 
OK
 t-1 0.09*** 0.07* 0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.04)* (0.001) 
Rint
 t-1 0.02 1.97*** -0.002*** 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.00003) 
 
   
Sargan 1 1 1 
m1 0.08 0 0 
m2 0.34 0.69 0.2 
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Figure 1: HP Filtered Biannual Net Capital Inflows/Gross Inflows Ratio, 1984:1-2003:2   
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Notes: ARGHPTREND, MXHPTREND and TRHPTREND stand for HP Trend of net short-term 
capital inflows/gross short term capital inflows ratio for Argentina, Mexico and Turkey respectively. 
The ratio is calculated using biannual data and is based on gross inflows that are the biannual sum of 
the absolute value of monthly net capital inflows, and net inflows that are the biannual sum of the 
monthly net capital inflows. For comparison, net inflows are in absolute value. A decrease in this 
ratio reflects increasing volatility. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the US Treasury International Capital Reporting System.  
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Figure 2: Volatility of Real Short-Term Capital Inflows in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey 
1991:1-2003:2 
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Notes: RSCFI: ARSCFV, MXSCFV and TRSCFV are biannual standard deviation of real Short 
Term Capital Inflows in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey measured as discussed in Section 4.2.  
Source: Author’s calculations using the US Treasury International Capital Reporting System for 
Argentina and Mexico and for Turkey using the monthly BOP statistics of Turkey. 
 
 
 
